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Design as Interactions of Problem Framing and Problem Solving
Martin Dzbor and Zdenek Zdrahal §
Abstract.   This paper introduces a model of framing in design. The
model takes into account a reflective nature of designing, and it is
based on the interplay between two conceptually distinct knowledge
sources – an explicit specification of a problem and a solution to it.
The approach is novel in the former investigated aspect that is pre-
sented as a semi-formal operation of framing, i.e. interpretation of a
problem using selected conceptual primitives. We argue that the
interpretation of design problems lacks a similar rigorous investiga-
tion as problem solving received in both design theory and method-
ology. Furthermore, two design schemas of frame refinement and
problem re-framing are discussed and exemplified.
1. INTRODUCTION
While much effort has been put toward computational models of
problem solving in design, there are gaps in the problem interpreta-
tion. The existing models understand design as a problem of gener-
ating solutions to a problem specification, which is assumed to
remain unchanged during the design process. Consequently, they
neglect the interpretation of the design problem in terms of an ex-
plicit specification. This paper presents design as a two-way inter-
action of articulating and solving the problem specifications.
A design task occurs when an agent decides to change the status
of the surrounding world [1]. It is a goal-oriented process that ar-
ticulates the means for realising the desired changes (e.g. in form of
technological artefacts). Usually, design is an ill-structured task [2],
to which a solution may not be found until significant effort to un-
derstand the ‘structure’ of the problem has been made. Nonetheless,
what does it mean to ‘give a problem its structure’? Is it possible to
model such a structuring or framing using formal language instead
of vague terminology of ‘intuition’ and ‘insight’ [3]?
The need for a problem interpretation reflects the fact that the
designers are rarely given a detailed specification of a problem [4].
A specification of a design problem is built from the initial vague
desires, and must be subject to the same evolution as a design solu-
tion. We believe that a set of statements characterising a desired
state may be proclaimed ‘a specification’ only at the end of design;
i.e. once a designer is satisfied with a proposed artefact, and accepts
it as a design solution. An idea of ‘co-evolving’ design solutions
and specifications is not new [5]. However, there are limited formal
accounts of this phenomenon in the literature.
The initial incomplete requirements are transformed onto an ac-
ceptable specification of a design problem and its solution. Partial
solutions influence the requirements, and in turn, the modified re-
quirements refine the solutions, thus revealing the aforementioned
co-evolution. Empirically, such a co-evolution is associated with the
shaping (framing) of a design situation. Schön [4] argues that the
practitioners ‘know’ how to achieve their goals, and shape (frame)
the design situation to reflect this tacit and experiential knowledge.
In this paper, we look at the patterns of ‘problem framing’, and de-
velop a conceptual model of framing with two illustrative schemas.
To investigate the relationship between the problem specification
and solution development, we conducted 24 experiments with de-
sign practitioners. They were solving nontrivial tasks from a domain
of controllers for large-scale systems. We illustrate our findings on
the session designing a controller for a paper-smoothing plant. For
additional details of the experiment settings see also [6, 7].
One of the tasks was to design a layout and control strategy for a
plant that takes raw wrinkled paper on the input, and delivers evenly
thick, smooth paper at the other end. In a design process, we par-
ticularly focused on the designer’s reflective behaviour resulting in
a problem re-framing. The illustrative sketches of a plant shown in
Figures 1 to 3 are scanned from the designer’s notes. These are the
main milestones in the designer’s reasoning process:
1. an initial principle for smoothing features a pair of rolling
drums with paper passing through a gap between;
2. this layout is enhanced, when a designer suggests dampening
the raw paper before entering the rolling drums, and drying it
afterwards to achieve acceptable performance
Æ introduction of an additional assumption restricting the
scope of solution acceptability (see Figure 1);
Figure 1.   Linear sequence of drums, pre- and post-processing
3. another reflective turn occurs when a designer finds out that
smoothing depends on the pressure of the drums, which may
damage certain types of paper; an alternative is to reduce the
pressure and increase the size of the plant
Æ contradictory requirements are spotted and attended;
4. layout of the drums is re-engineered (from linear to alternate)
Æ re-interpretation of a concept from the current frame leads
to an alternative solution in a new frame (see Figure 2);
Figure 2.   ‘Zigzag’ sequence Æ smaller dimensions, better effectiveness
5. the principle of rolling is given up and replaced by ‘abrasion’
(this is accompanied by a re-design of a solution)
Æ shift in a design perspective (frame), seeing smoothing as
an instance of a different physical principle (see Figure 3);
6. final design solution consists of: (a) pairs of drums to unwind
the raw paper and maintain the tension before the output coil;
(b) rolling drums ‘merged’ with dampening mechanism; and
(c) from each pair only one drum remains; the drums are posi-
tioned in a ‘zigzag’ manner (see Figure 3, below)
In our opinion, the observed modifications of problem specifica-
tion cannot be attributed purely to a search for the ‘right’ solution.
The milestones described above feature also a process of explora-
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tion [8] that involves the construction of a design space and inter-
pretation of a design problem. This exploration may show many as-
pects of intuitive and tacit reasoning but some of its patterns are
explicable in terms of evolving conceptual frames and solution ac-
ceptability. Let us detail these arguments below.
Figure 3.   Design solution in a re-interpreted design frame
2. WHAT IS A DESIGN FRAME?
In connection with problem shaping, cognitive science often men-
tions term ‘design perspective’ [9]. A perspective is a point of view,
which implies that certain design goals exist, certain bodies of de-
sign knowledge are relevant, and certain solution forms are pre-
ferred. The term ‘design perspective’ is mainly used for expressing
a designer’s intentions. We may understand a design perspective as
a kind of vocabulary of concepts decided upon during problem
framing, and used in the problem solving phase of design.
The first major gap in the existing research is an interpretation
and a formal clarification of terms ‘frame’ and ‘framing’. The em-
pirical evidence suggest that framing is an important reasoning step
that precedes the problem solving and complements it [4, 10, 11].
However, what are the implications of ‘framing’ on the knowledge
level? What is happening with a designer’s knowledge during the
problem framing? Can this ‘framing’ be expressed formally? These
are some of the challenges we tackle in the further text.
2.1 Essential definitions
Assume a designer is tackling a design problem; let us denote this
design problem as $3. In order to solve design problem $3, the
designer characterises it by an explicit selection of statements from
a hypothetical space of potentially applicable problem specifica-
tions 6*. Such explicit problem specification, denoted as S⊆ 6*,
provides a context for applicable design methods and domain theo-
ries. These methods and theories are tools enabling the designer to
satisfy the explicit specification. However, since the problem speci-
fication is only an interpretation of $3, the solution satisfying S
must not necessarily be a solution to $3. This important distinction
is discussed more thoroughly later.
We understand problem specification as a set of statements de-
scribing the desired states, and expressed in a suitable language; e.g.
first-order logic. Formally, we may say that a designer circum-
scribes1 $3 by declaring that only the statements from the explicit
specification S are needed for interpreting and solving the problem.
This circumscriptive step can be expressed by relation (1).
∃ S ⊆ 6*: specifiesΦ ( S, $3 )   (1)
This assertion can be only made within certain conceptual
boundaries – a conceptual design frame. We define design frame Φ
as a pair of two circumscribed knowledge spaces that are con-
structed on top of the allowed problem specifications 6 and the
relevant problem conceptualisation 7. Thus, ‘framing a design
problem’ means articulating a set of conceptual objects 7 that may
be used for doing the design, as specifiable by the concepts from 6
                                                          
1 This is indeed a circumscription [12] whose purpose is to ‘close’ designer’s
understanding of an incomplete, ill-defined design problem.
(relevant problem specifications). Let us use symbols 6* and 7* for
a formal notation of the circumscribed knowledge spaces con-
structed on top of both conceptual entities (6 and 7).
Space 7* is ‘a closure’ constituted by the selected conceptuali-
sation 7 and an appropriate domain theory DT. Domain theory DT
is a problem-independent knowledge, possibly applicable to many
different problems. For example, physics is a domain theory appli-
cable to a design of elevators as well as spacecraft. However, for
different problems, different parts of the domain are used. We say
that a generic domain theory DT is ‘instantiated’ for a particular
conceptual base 7, in order to obtain a usable theory for solving the
problem. Let us therefore, refer to closure 7* as a problem solving
theory. Similarly, closure 6* as a hypothetical instantiation of the
generic problem specification statements 6 in the chosen conceptu-
alisation (7). Finally, we express design frame Φ formally, as fol-
lows: Φ = 〈7, 6〉, and interpret the terms used in its definition:
a) A space of problem conceptualisations 7 is an ontology, a vo-
cabulary of basic concepts, for which a designer decides they
are available for expressing statements about a particular
problem. A conceptual base may include a terminology for the
definition of functional and structural objects, as well as prob-
lem-specific mappings between the functions and structures,
e.g. in form of behaviours [13].
b) A domain theory DT is a shared ontology, a generic vocabu-
lary defining the background [14], against which any concep-
tualisation is applied. Domain theory per se is too generic and
abstract for problem solving; only its interpretation in a spe-
cific conceptualisation yields a usable problem solving theory.
c) A space of relevant problem specifications 6* complements
the problem solving theories 7*. Its principal purpose is to
provide a vocabulary for expressing the desires or intentions of
a designer in a particular problem [9]. It can be seen as a set of
statements that can be formulated about the elements of a par-
ticular problem solving theory.
Design frames, as defined above, do not exist ‘per se’. They are
highly volatile, and are constructed (and re-constructed) on the fly
using the information about a particular design problem that is
available to a designer. Typically, a designer uses a customer’s ini-
tial design brief to identify similar design situations, he or she is
familiar with. These familiar terms then serve as a seed for articu-
lating an initial explicit problem specification (S). The relationship
between familiarity and framing is a desirable corollary of our the-
ory, because it relates to empirical observations [4, 9, 10].
After the initial specification the conceptual design continues
with a formulation of a minimal sub-set T⊆ 7* that satisfies the
‘given’ problem specification (S⊆ 6*). Symbol S denotes all such
statements that serve to specify the desires about a design problem
$3, to which a designer made a specific and explicit commitment.
In other words, a designer tries to shrink the vast space provided by
a problem solving theory 7* into a manageable size that can be ma-
nipulated with. This manageable chunk corresponds to the term
‘solution model’ [15, 16]. Or perhaps, due to its generative nature, it
is better to call it a ‘problem solving model’.
Formally, a problem solving model is a minimal sub-set of the
problem solving theory that sufficiently satisfies the explicit prob-
lem specification. Relation ‘satisfies’ is binary, because it associates
a problem solving model T with an explicit problem specification S,
(with the underlying frame Φ as a circumscribing contextual pa-
rameter). Formal definition of a problem solving model is in (2).
∃ T ⊆ 7*: satisfiesΦ (T, S)  ∧  ( ¬∃ Y ⊂ T: satisfiesΦ (Y, S) )   (2)
From an operational point, it is possible to distinguish design re-
quirements R from design constraints C, and assert that a problem
specification is a union of the two – i.e. S = R ∪ C [14]. In this
context, requirements are those statements demanding the explicit
presence of a particular feature, whereas constraints are conditions
that must not be explicitly violated by a design solution. More on
the conceptual distinction between requirements and constraints can
be found in [6, 14]. In this paper, we only present a simplified defi-
nition of relation ‘satisfies’ in (3) below:
satisfiesΦ ( T, S ) ⇔ {(S = R ∪ C) ⇒  T Ê R ∧ ¬(T, C t ⊥)}   (3)
In (3), the symbols used have their usual meanings [17] – ‘Ê’ is a
semantic entailment, ‘t’ is a proof-logical implication, and ‘⊥’ is an
‘empty’ formula, contradiction. Accordingly, theory T is a problem
solving model in respect to a given explicit problem specification S
and a design frame Φ, if it is complete in respect to the required
features (∀ r∈ R: T Ê r), and admissible in respect to constraining
conditions (¬∃ c∈ C: T,c t ⊥). In other words, a candidate solution
must have a potential to deliver all required features without contra-
dicting the constraints.
As already mentioned, the explicit problem specification is only
an interpretation of a design problem $3, which is used in problem
solving. It is not the same as problem $3. Thus, the existence of a
problem solving model T, for which relation ‘satisfies’ holds, is a
necessary but not sufficient condition of declaring it a ‘design solu-
tion’! In addition to satisfying the explicit specification, the discov-
ered problem solving model T must be also ‘acceptable’ as a design
solution! Unfortunately, a relation of ‘acceptability’ cannot be de-
fined explicitly in advance. It is often appreciated subjectively and
tacitly, and cannot be expressed in the languages of 6 or 7.
Nevertheless, it may be defined as a residual category. Formula
(4) may help understand the role of the relation of problem solving
model acceptability’. What does it mean that a relation is residual?
We argue that it means the same, as the argument advanced in [18]
saying that certain tacit decisions cannot be stripped of their con-
textual background. It may be difficult to define exact conditions of
‘acceptability’, but a designer may proclaim a certain problem
solving model acceptable or not, when reflecting on it. Tacit reflec-
tion on acceptability makes sense only in a particular context, such
as frame Φ. Note the change in formula (4) – the contextual pa-
rameter for the relation ‘acceptable’ is $3 instead of Φ.
satisfiesΦ (T, S) ∧ ¬acceptable$3 (T) ⇒  ¬specifiesΦ (S, $3)  (4)
We interpret formula (4) so that whenever an otherwise admissi-
ble problem solving model is not accepted by a designer as a design
solution, it may point to an incorrect (~ incomplete) specification of
the actual design problem. The explicit interpretation of a design
problem $3 in terms of statements S, does not reflect the real de-
sign problem $3, and it may be desirable to amend it. Such an
amendment may feature a refinement of the existing design frame,
or a formulation of a new frame (re-framing) that are discussed in
the remainder of this paper.
2.2 Design as a sequence of conceptual decisions
In the following paragraphs, we propose a recursive model of
framing in design using the conceptual entities defined in section
2.1. The model is defined as a sequence of decisions driven by the
validity (i.e. returned values) of predicates ‘satisfies’ and ‘specifies’
(both defined in section 2.1). The sequence is running across several
mutually dependent, conceptual levels; in Figure 4 they are labelled
‘0’ to ‘5’. The model shows the interaction of two distinct knowl-
edge-level actions represented by predicates ‘specifies’ and ‘satis-
fies’. The former action is amending the problem specification, the
latter attempts to solve problem interpreted (specified) in this way.
We define also the predicates representing the aforementioned
re-interpretations. These definitions intuitively interpret the model
as a sequence of decisions followed by actions. The simplest form
of design problem re-interpretation attempts to explicate a statement
that is believed to refine the current specification. If such a state-
ment can be articulated within the current frame Φ (and the con-
ceptual languages 7 and 6), design continues with a refined frame
and refined explicit specification as shown in Figure 4, level 3. A
refinement within a given conceptual frame is defined in (5).
can-refine-specΦ ( S )  ⇔
∃s∈ 6*: S ⊆ 6*  ∧ S’ = S ∪ {s}  ∧  specifiesΦ ( S’, $3 )
 (5)
Slightly more complex decision shown in (6) features an attempt
to re-interpret the existing explicit problem specification in a new
frame. The problem specification is still refined; however, the new
statements are introduced from a new design frame rather than the
existing one. Schema (6) differs from one in (5) in the fact that the
refinement must be accompanied by a change of the conceptual
frame (i.e. the currently used conceptual categories from set 6).
This technique tries to resolve the ‘tacit’ non-acceptance of a solu-
tion by committing to the terminology borrowed from a new or dif-
ferent design frame.
can-reframe-spec ( S, Φ )  ⇔
∃ΦNEW = 〈7, 6N〉: S’ ⊆ 6N*  ∧  specifiesΦNEW ( S’, $3 )  (6)
The most radical form of problem and frame re-interpretation is
defined in (7). In this particular case, the conceptual foundation of
the current conceptual frame Φ (i.e. 7 – set of selected conceptual
objects) is not consistent with the explicit problem specification S.
An admissible solution cannot be found in the current problem
solving theory 7*, because it is inconsistent. To restore the consis-
tency, a new conceptualisation 7N is chosen. New frame ΦNEW is
articulated so that the current explicit specification S⊆ 6N* is con-
sistent, and an admissible interpretation of a design problem exists
(albeit in a different frame, different conceptual vocabulary).
Level Reasoning steps and their sequence
0. specifiesΦ (S, $3)
1. satisfiesΦ ( T, S )
2. acceptable$3 ( T )
design-solutionΦ ( T ) ∧ specifiesΦ ( S, $3)                  (design ends successfully)
3. can-refine-frameΦ ( S )                       (yields new explicit problem specification S’)
Prove that “∃T ⊆ 7*: satisfiesΦ ( T, S’ )” holds.                   [go to 1.] T
4. can-reframe-spec ( S, Φ )             (yields new frame ΦNEW = 〈7, 6N〉)
Prove that “∃T ⊆ 7*: satisfiesΦNEW ( T, S’ )” holds.
[go to 1.] T
5. can-reframe-concept ( Φ )                      (yields new design frame ΦNEW = 〈7N, 6〉, but also 6N*)
Prove that “∃T’ ⊆ 7N*: satisfiesΦN ( T’, S )” holds.                                       [go to 1.] T
¬∃Φ = 〈7, 6〉: T ⊆ 7* ∧ acceptable$3 ( T )                  (design ends unsuccessfully) ⊥













can-reframe-concept ( Φ )  ⇔
∃ΦNEW = 〈7N, 6〉: T’⊆ 7N*  ∧ S⊆ 6N*  ∧  specifiesΦNEW ( S, $3 )  (7)
The recursive model depicted in Figure 4 reflects the empirical
observations of the knowledge-level interactions that emerged from
our experiments. The interactions between complementary knowl-
edge sources are observable in an exchange of information and
control between predicates ‘specifies’ and ‘satisfies’ during a design
process. In a construction of the model we made these assumptions:
1) When using terms ‘requirements’ and ‘constraints’, we always
mean hard, strict demands that must not be relaxed.
2) A monotonic extension of a problem specification corresponds
to a designer’s attempt to ‘fine tune’ a problem solving model,
to reduce the number of derivable alternatives. Problem speci-
fication can be refined, only if an admissible problem solving
model exists for the current conceptual frame.
3) Sentences “Try proving that λ holds.” represent a recursive
step returning to level 1 of the model, and a designer’s attempt
to address the unresolved issue by amending one or another
available knowledge space. It is a kind of ‘order’ to an agent to
evaluate the predicate λ with the new arguments provided.
Let us describe two reasoning schemas that are explainable di-
rectly from the proposed recursive model. Note that these are not
problem solving methods. They are proposed as abstract models of
certain types of reasoning that may be observed in a conceptual de-
sign. Due to limited space, we discuss in detail only two patterns
showing frame amendment. First, it is a non-monotonic introduction
of new knowledge refining the frame in a form of assumptions. The
second schema is an example of conceptual re-framing.
2.3 Frame refinement & implicit assumptions
Consider the following situation that was observed in the design of
a paper-smoothing plant. This section refines milestone 2 from sec-
tion 1, and in the recursive model is represented as a path leading to
the predicate ‘can-refine-frameΦ (S)’. At a certain stage, a designer
considered a sequence of rolling drums2 that applied pressure on the
raw paper, thus reducing its thickness, and smoothing its surface.
When deriving the consequences of this simple approach, he ob-
served that the effectiveness of both operations depended on the
actual pressure and the ‘active’ surface of drums. The higher the
pressure, the greater the expected quality. Nonetheless, paper was a
relatively fragile medium with certain limits in respect to tension,
and it could tear, if certain limits were exceeded.
The designer thus could not accept a simple sequence of rolling
drums as an acceptable solution, despite the completeness and ad-
missibility of the candidate in respect to the explicit specification.
The paper was smoothed and thickness was reduced as desired.
However, the designer assumed another condition that was never
mentioned in the customer’s initial brief. In addition to requiring
paper smoothing and thickness reduction, he also demanded the pa-
per remained whole (i.e. not torn or otherwise damaged). In a justi-
fying record of this introduction of new knowledge, he maintained
that it was “an obvious condition often not emphasised explicitly”.
When we attend to this apparently straightforward situation, we
see that the conceptual base 7 for a problem interpretation re-
mained unchanged. The addition of a new assumption monotoni-
cally refined the explicit specification (6*⊇ S’ = S∪ {s}). However,
this monotonic refinement had implications on the otherwise non-
monotonic problem solving theory 7* with a candidate solution (T).
The new assumption rendered the ‘old’ candidate solution T inad-
missible; the new condition was obviously violated by the ‘old’
candidate solution. A new problem solving model T’ was found,
and it featured pre- and post-processing units (in Figure 1 labelled
                                                          
2 Let us mark this candidate solution by symbol T, as defined in section 2.1.
as ‘moisture’ and ‘dry’). These additional commitments further re-
fined the problem specification, requiring a softened paper, so that a
lower pressure was needed, and the danger of tearing eliminated.
What happened in this situation from a knowledge-level point of
view, can be seen as an alignment of an explicit conceptual frame
with the designer’s implicit or tacit expectations. These ‘tacit’ as-
sumptions and expectations are ‘hidden’; however, they may tacitly
influence a designer’s decision on the solution acceptability. When
an admissible candidate solution is found unacceptable, these ex-
pectations may become useful. Reflecting on the ‘hidden’ (perhaps
experiential) expectations, the designer may become aware of ‘for-
gotten’ features, and s/he explicitly articulates a new statement to
address such a feature. With a new statement, the existing problem
solving theory may become inconsistent, and may need to be con-
ceptually amended. However, the actual addition of new concepts is
a topic covered by a different reasoning schema in section 2.4.
2.4 Conceptual re-framing & contradictory theory
Consider another type of re-interpretation that was observed in the
design of paper-smoothing plant, as well as in other experiments.
This section refines points 3, 4 from the milestones in section 1, and
focuses on the predicate ‘can-reframe-concept (Φ)’. A sequence of
rolling drums with pre- and post-processing units in Figure 1 de-
picts a candidate solution at a certain stage. This solution had no
apparent weakness; it complied with the designer’s experience with
similar problems (e.g. metal sheet rolling). However, when a de-
signer took into account the efficiency and controllability of the
smoothing operation, a new issue emerged. As already mentioned in
section 2.3, higher pressure or larger active surface of rolling im-
proved a low quality of processed paper. The increases in pressure
were tackled earlier, and it was resolved to add the additional proc-
essing steps to soften the paper, rather than increase the pressure.
Adding more pairs of rolling drums to the sequence could in-
crease the active surface. Nonetheless, the sequence could not grow
forever, because a larger size implied a more difficult control. It
was clear that trying to design an assembly with fewer drums was
desirable in order to simplify the plant operation. However, fewer
drums affected the quality and increased the danger of damaging
paper by a higher pressure that was needed. Thus, the designer
found himself in a ‘magical circle’ of contradictory requirements.
He resolved the contradiction by shifting his conceptual founda-
tion. Instead of squeezing or expanding the rolling assembly in ‘one
dimension’ (i.e. linearly laid-out drums), he articulated the concept
‘two-dimensional layout’ originating in a more cumbersome ‘two-
dimensional squeezing’. This shift towards a new concept intro-
duced an alternate (zigzag) layout of the drums that featured larger
effective surface of rolling. Thus, fewer pairs were needed, and the
size- as well as pressure-related constraints could be managed – si-
multaneously. The new concepts are clearly visible in a re-designed
assembly (see Figure 2 in section 1).
A similar reasoning step introducing new concepts to tackle an
outstanding conflict was repeated in milestone 5 (see section 1). In
this step, the designer made another conceptual re-framing. He re-
visited his initial interpretation of rolling as the principle of paper
smoothing. Instead focusing on the pressure application, he became
aware that in a zigzag layout one drum was using a much larger sur-
face than the other one in a pair. Hence, he removed a ‘redundant’
drum from each rolling pair, and replaced the principle of pressing
with a principle of abrasion. The components of the plant were
similar as before but their conceptual roles were re-interpreted in
the new frame, eventually leading to a design depicted in Figure 3.
Unlike in section 2.3, where a problem specification was only
monotonically refined, this operation went far deeper. It began with
a contradictory problem solving theory 7*, in which some con-
straints were always violated (i.e. ∃ c∈ C: 7*,c t ⊥). Since none of
the violated conditions could be ‘retracted’, the designer was forced
to re-visit the applicable domain theory, as interpreted in conceptual
terms 7. Having defined new conceptual primitives (e.g. ‘2D lay-
out’ or ‘abrasion’), he actually changed his conceptual vocabulary
for interpreting and solving design problem $3.
A new conceptual base 7N triggered articulation of a new con-
ceptual frame ΦNEW, and in the context of new frame, the conflicting
constraints ‘lost their edge’. The ‘re-conceptualised’ problem solv-
ing theory regained its consistency, and design could continue –
until other ‘hidden’ expectations in the next steps invalidated the
current perspective. The schema for handling contradictions gives a
theoretical, knowledge-level background to an empirically observed
resolution of physical contradictions in the inventive designs by re-
ferring to less-usual conceptual vocabulary [15].
3. DISCUSSION & CONCLUDING REMARKS
The schemas proposed above are defined using knowledge-level
concepts and conceptual design frames. They model selected rea-
soning patterns, which conceptually underpin a designer’s evolving
understanding of a design problem. It is interesting to investigate,
what is going on ‘inside’ the relation ‘satisfiesΦ (T, S)’ or ‘inside’
the defined re-framing techniques. However, this paper is concerned
with a more abstract level of investigation. Although the details of
operational models of the conceptual schemas are beyond the scope
of this paper, let us discuss a few remarks in that direction.
Why is a logically admissible design questioned? We already
mentioned that one reason is the difference between an explicit
frame and the implicit and ‘tacit’ expectations. The adjective ‘tacit’
deserves more attention because it seems to be closely related to
problem framing. In section 2, we defined design frame as an inter-
pretation of an ill-structured problem using a familiar vocabulary of
the similar design cases tackled in the past. The ‘tacit’ and implicit
expectations draw on these familiar, past situations. A designer may
perceive a similarity between the current and previous cases on dif-
ferent levels of abstraction. Sometimes, the analogy may be too ab-
stract or too complex to articulate it in the explicit terms of a chosen
conceptualisation. Simpler analogies may be re-used in tackling the
new problem easily; the more abstract ones may remain ‘hidden’.
According to formula (4), these past experiences may be hard to
articulate explicitly in advance, as standalone analogies. Their es-
sence comes forward in the context of a particular conceptual frame
with a particular problem specification and a candidate solution.
The examination of consequences of a particular commitment may
raise a designer’s awareness of inadequacy in the current approach.
Such is the origin of the frame refinement described in section 2.3.
Past knowledge of pre-heating metal slabs before rolling was con-
trasted with a lack of any similar operation in an otherwise analo-
gous problem. The designer went to investigate the reasons of pre-
processing in the past case, and became aware of material flexibil-
ity. Eventually, a notion of improved flexibility was translated into
the ‘paper’ context as a new assumption on the paper fragility, and
an ‘intuitive’ articulation of a new condition became clearer.
Similarly, the conceptual re-framing in section 2.4 may seem
confusing and sudden. It surely is sudden and unexplainable within
the particular conceptual frame. To explain it we may relate the
framing to a ‘temporary’ circumscription of an incomplete problem
space. By committing to certain explicit conceptual primitives, the
context for problem solving is deliberately circumscribed. However,
the closure may be re-opened, and the problem circumscribed in a
slightly different manner. We believe this is the main difference of
the proposed recursive model in comparison to the existing research
[1, 8, 12, 13, 16].
The other models typically start with an assumption of a ‘given’
problem specification, and focus on the solution. In other words,
they are concerned with solving the problems. In this paper, we
made a step towards a more formal conceptual basis of interpreting
the problems by solving them. In this aspect, the research reported
in this paper, extends the empirical work on reflection and evolution
in design [4, 11]. Moreover, the problem interpretation through the
interaction between problem framing and problem solving ad-
dresses the exploratory nature of design mentioned at the beginning
[8]. Design problems are inherently open; by framing they can be
‘closed’ (circumscribed), in order to address their incompleteness,
complexity, and poor structure.
Similar models of design appear in [1, 11, 18]; however, we at-
tempted to present a more formal description of the conceptual
phase of design. Although this model is too abstract for the purpose
of implementation, it can be seen as a set of guidelines that can
serve as a seed of a structured and principled methodology for de-
sign support. We hope to elaborate this principled version of the re-
cursive model of framing in more detail, including its operational
details and implementation in a real-world setting.
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